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UNIFICATION: A CHEERFUL REQUIEM FOR
COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT*
Ralph S. Brown, Jr.**
The greatest change of the 1976 Copyright Act has been at-
tended with the least controversy. Common-law copyright, the
protection by state law of unpublished works, effectively disap-
pears. A dual system that has persisted since the beginning of
the republic gives way to a unified national copyright. To be sure,
the cleavage between common-law and statutory copyright under
the old scheme was far from total; likewise the absorption of state-
created rights into the new statute is also not total. But the works
now left entirely to state protection are almost wraith-like; and the
states are given little authority to affect rights in works of author-
ship that are within the subject matter of the statute.
This paper will attempt to describe the extent of the changes,
with a caution that we are dealing with a newborn statute, which
may mature in unforeseen ways. We will first recall the strange
shape that the 1909 Act took in accommodating to strained no-
tions of "publication," and then see how the new law, by com-
mencing statutory copyright with the first fixation of a work in any
medium from which it can be reproduced, mostly wipes out the
significance of publication. A forecast of some of the conse-
quences for the major media will be essayed. The outcome is ac-
claimed as unifying, and is reinforced by the assertion of federal
preemption, in section 301. However, examination of the en-
acted form of section 301 discloses significant and controversial
ambiguities. My thesis is that these ambiguities ought to be re-
solved in the direction of more thorough unification, instead of
leaving to the states substantial segments of artistic and literary
production which, in my view, ought to have a uniform national
disposition.
I. THE OLD REGIME
What was there about common-law copyright which made it
* Certain citation conventions are employed throughout this' Symposium.
These conventions are presented at page vii.
** Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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such a poor thing that no one fought to retain it? Its growth had
continued even after some of its roots were severed by the House
of Lords in Donaldson v. Becket,1 and by the Supreme Court in
Wheaton v. Peters.2 Those leading cases held that published
works must look to the respective English and American statutes
for protection. But, at least in this country, the converse proposi-
tion remained intact: "That an author, at common law,' has a prop-
erty in his manuscript," said Justice McLean in Wheaton v. Peters,
"and may obtain redress against anyone who deprives him of it,
or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realize a profit
by its publication, cannot be doubted."'
The author's manuscript so stood and still stands as the arche-
type of the kind of work that needed protection before publica-
tion, just as the book typifies the central subject-matter of copy-
right in published works. The Statute of Anne4 spoke only of
books; the first American statute, appropriately for a new-found
land, comprehended maps, charts and books.5 These could be ef-
fectively disseminated only by "printing, reprinting, publishing
and vending," (these were the rights secured by the statute) so
that there were no gaps of any significance in the scheme. 6 Be-
yond this protection, the first Congress, apparently aware even
then how fearful authors are that someone will steal their stuff,
provided a "special action on the case" against anyone who with-
out consent should "print or publish any manuscript."'7  Appar-
ently no one at that time or subsequently read this provision as
having any effect in pre-empting common-law rights; it was rou-
tinely included, apparently little noticed and modestly used, in the
successive revisions of the statute through that of 1891.8
Meanwhile, beyond the primitive paradigm of the book and
its manuscript, the range of works that sought and got statutory
protection was expanding: in 1802, to "any historical or other
1 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
2 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
3 Id. at 657.
4 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709).
5 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
6 The penalty provision provided for unauthorized imports. Id. §§ 2, 5.
7 Id. § 6. All copyright has been statutory in England since 1911. E. P.
SKONE JAMES, COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 19 (1971).
8 Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481; Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,
§ 9, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 102, 106, 16 Stat. 215; Act of
March 3, 1891, ch. 565, §§ 9 (amending Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 102,
106, 16 Stat. 215), 13, 26 Stat. 1106.
Along the way, the "action on the case" became simply an action for dam-
ages. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 102, 16 Stat. 215. See E. DRONE, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 124-26 (1879),
on the use of § 102 and its predecessors. The cases cited by Drone suggest noth-
ing more exciting than a duplication of common law rights.
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print";" in 1831, to musical compositions; 10 in 1865, to photo-
graphs;" and in 1870, to paintings, drawings and other produc-
tions "intended as works of fine arts."' 2 All these, while unpub-
lished, doubtless had some common-law protection. Congress
was now protecting their dissemination in published forms. It
seems unlikely that it intended to provide any additional protec-
tion to unpublished works, beyond the old section that safe-
guarded manuscripts; one attempt by a litigant to extend "manu-
script" beyond its common meaning to include a painting was re-
buffed.'"
The thorough-going revision of 1909 made a brave try at de-
limiting the spheres of common-law and statutory copyright. Sec-
tion 2 was a flat affirmation that "nothing in this title shall be con-
strued to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of
an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the
copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his
consent, and to obtain damages therefor."' 4 Yet at the same time
what is now section 12 (originally section 11) created an optional
route to statutory copyright for works "of which copies are not re-
produced for sale," that is, for unpublished works.15 Simple de-
posit requirements provided statutory protection for dramatic
works, lectures, musical compositions, photographs and other
works--everything indeed except books, periodicals, maps, prints,
and reproductions of works of art (if one can take the classes for
registration set out in section 516 as a fair representation of the
scope of the 1909 Act) .17 Section 12, however, was not taken as
9 Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171.
10 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436.
11 Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
12 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212. These and other ex-
pansions of the types of works protected by the statute are conveniently collected
in Note, Study of the Term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1263, 1269 (1956). See also Derenberg, The Meanings
of "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, COPYRIGHT OF-
FICE STUDY No. 3 at 72-73 (1956), reprinted in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 50-51
(Copyright Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed. 1963); Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication
of Sound Recordings, COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY No. 26 (1957), reprinted in
I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 117 (Copyright Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed. 1963).
13 Parton v. Prang, 18 F. Cas. 1273 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872) (No. 10,784).
14 1909 ACT § 2.
15 Id. § 12.
16 Id. § 5.
17 The basis for selecting these classes of works for inclusion in § 12
remains somewhat mysterious. Weil, a contemporary treatise-writer, suggested
that they were "those chiefly useful for exhibition, representation, or performance"
-that is, there was no need to disseminate copies of them. A. WEIL, AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT LAW 155 (1917) [hereinafter cited as WEIL]. This is a plausible ex-
planation, as is its corollary that the works not eligible under § 12-books and
periodicals, maps, prints, and reproductions of works of art--could be exploited
only by publication and therefore would have to seek statutory copyright in any
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preemptive of common-law rights; rather, it was construed as af-
fording an option which if chosen, it came to be agreed, did super-
sede common-law rights.' 8
What were common-law rights in lectures, dramatic and mu-
sical compositions and works of art? As to works of art, twenti-
eth-century courts, with slim nineteenth-century precedents, rec-
ognized a common-law right to exhibit a work without losing the
right to first publication of copies-provided that some reservation
of rights was manifested by regulations of the exhibition against
copying.' 9 This exhibition right, while a desirable prop for the
artist who wanted to display his paintings or sculptures, did not
permit any extensive exploitation outside the statute. The artist
who sought a reward by authorizing reproductions would be au-
thorizing publication, and would have to publish with notice.
20
The recognition of a common-law right to control perform-
ances, in the case of dramatic and musical works, had much wider
event. To be sure, some of the kinds of works included in § 12 were also ex-
ploited by publication in print-notably musical compositions, in an era when
sheet music was flourishing.
18 See Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph
Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 477 (1955).
One can make an argument, now of only antiquarian interest, that §§ 2 and
12 of the 1909 Act have both been too narrowly applied, and that together they
represented a complete system of federal protection for unpublished works-so
complete that little would have been left to the states. First-the argument would
go-§ 12 should be read preemptively. This was suggested by Weil, writing at
a time close to the 1909 revision and to Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912);
WEIL, supra note 17, at 157 (1917); and again by Selvin, Should Performance
Dedicate?, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 45 (1954).
As for § 2, it has been routinely read only as recognizing common-law, i.e.,
state-created, rights in unpublished works. Does it not say so, with its reference
to rights "at common law or in equity"? And the House Committee Report on
the 1909 Act, H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909), a piece of legis-
lative history that has been kept alive by reference and reprinting, e.g., H. How-
ELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 214 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as HOWELL] , says
that it wanted to "be perfectly clear that nothing in the bill was intended to im-
pair in any way the common-law rights with respect to this kind of a work"-
"this kind of a work" presumably meaning "an unpublished work." But the Re-
port also said, in the same short paragraph, that § 2 "is new in phraseology, al-
though substantially the same provision is found in section 4967 of the Revised
Statutes." HOWELL, supra, at 222. Section 4967 is the provision, coming down
from the Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, that creates a federal cause
of action for damages for the unauthorized publication of a manuscript. Did the
drafters mean to continue this federal remedy? If they did, no one ever noticed,
except Judge Learned Hand, who in another connection noted the provenance of
§ 2, and that its predecessors gave a "remedy cumulative upon the state remedies."
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 666 (2d Cir.
1955) (dissenting opinion); cf. Wells v. Universal Pictures Co., 166 F.2d 690, 691
(2d Cir. 1948) (no federal jurisdiction if plaintiff's "rights depend on principles
of common law and equity").
'9 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
20 Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago,
320 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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consequences. The influential decision in Ferris v. Frohman21
held that there was such a common-law performance right in dra-
matic works. Whether the Court read history correctly is still de-
batable and debated; but this did not much matter since it was
making history. There had long been a statutory performance
right in plays published in print.22 Now it was settled that if the
author of a play chose not to publish it in print, performance did
not constitute a publication. The play could be exploited forever
on the stage, with perpetual common-law copyright protection,23
without compliance with statutory requirements. Common-law
copyright protection of unpublished plays remained even after the
1909 revision made statutory copyright available to unpublished
dramas.
24
The position that performance was not a publication that di-
vested common-law rights extended equally and easily to musical
compositions.2"  But the case for common-law rights in musical
compositions had a harder time resisting the insidious and per-
sistent notion that the widespread dissemination of the work on
phonograph records must amount to a publication. Though sev-
eral judges and writers so argued, this notion never quite pre-
vailed. 26 The Copyright Office supported the orthodox view that
the sale of phonograph records did not divest common-law rights
in the composition, by refusing to accept recordings as copies of
the work for registration.27 There was also general recognition
that it would be unreasonable to treat recordings as a mode of
publication unless there was some agreement on how, where, and
by whom the statutory notice was to be applied.
2 8
Finally, the impetus of Ferris v. Frohman carried forward
into broadcasting, a medium barely invented in 1912 when Ferris
was decided. Broadcasts were performances; rights in them were
all protected by common law, although radio and then television
came to fill the airwaves with a volume of performances that
surely overwhelmed all the other performing media, including mo-
tion pictures. The bulk of these performances of course consisted
of music and drama of independent authorship with their own
21 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
22 Act of August 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
23 See text accompanying note 39 infra.
24 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
25 McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v. White, 259 F. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
26 See generally, Kaplan, note 18 supra.
27 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1976).
28 See Kaplan, note 18 supra; B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER Topics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF Lrr-
ERARY, MUSICAL AND ARISTIC WORKS 79-93 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
KAPLAN & BROWN].
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copyrights. Yet beyond this sustenance derived from others,
broadcasting created its own works. In their broadcast form, they
had no home in the statute. Scripts for programs were not books
until they were published; they were common-law manuscripts.
And a radio or television program had only ephemeral life unless
it was taped, recorded, or filmed. A radio program, even when
it was recorded, was like a phonograph record, not acceptitble for
copyright. 29  A television program could be filmed with a sound
track, and then qualify for copyright as a motion picture. But
sound film was a cumbersome and expensive way to preserve a
broadcast event. It soon gave way to videotape, a convenient
medium but a foundling on the doorstep of the Copyright Office,
not entitled to recognition because it was in no way visually per-
ceptible. The Copyright Office had considered this to be a requi-
site for statutory copyrightability.3  Nevertheless, the door
opened in 1961. An amendment to the Copyright Office Regula-
tions attempted to legitimize videotapes by treating them as mo-
tion pictures."' This was a solution only as long as no one chal-
lenged the copyright legitimacy of videotapes, or for that matter
of the soundtracks of motion pictures.32 Neither conveys anything
directly to the eye, nor to the ear. In light of the difficulty of
finding a niche for these new forms in the existing statutory
scheme, it was perhaps better to continue to assert and accept that
the dominant medium of our time, television, was best protected
by the same common-law performance right pronounced on behalf
of the authors of an 1894 melodrama, "The Fatal Card."3
This survey of the disjointed connections between common-
29 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 21 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
NIMMER].
30 The requirement of visual perceptibility was the product of a widespread
misreading of a wrong-headed decision of the Supreme Court, White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). That case held that a player-
piano roll was not, under the statute, an infringing "copy" of the musical composi-
tion. A copy, said Justice Day, "appeals to the eye." Id. at 17. This was taken
to require that a work must be intelligible to the eye in order to qualify for statu-
tory copyright. This extrapolation from what the Court decided of course ex-
cluded phonograph records, motion picture sound tracks, and videotapes until the
copyright office nerved itself to ignore White-Smith, as does the new statute. See
NEw ACT §§ 101 (definition of "copies"), 102.
31 See Fritch, Some Copyright Implications of Videotapes, 37 S. CAL. L.
REV. 214 (1964), also in 13 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 87 (1964).
32 See Yuzek, Publication and Protection: In Qualified Support of the
Copyright Office Approach to Motion Picture Soundtracks, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 19 (1974). See also Copyright Office Regulations Amendment of March
19, 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 12,500 (codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.15(e), 202.15a(c)
(1976)).
33 This was the title of the work in Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424
(1912). See Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio & Television Programs
by Common Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. REV. 209 (1950).
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law (state) and statutory (federal) copyright may suggest why the
distinction was largely swept away in the General Revision. In
summary: Manuscripts-the unpublished forms of anything that
when published would be a book, pamphlet, periodical, map, or
print-were after 1909 protected only by state law. Practically
every other kind of work that was protectable at all could, while
unpublished, seek state protection against copying or perform-
ance; it could alternatively come under federal copyright while un-
published by way of section 12. Once any kind of work was "pub-
lished"-essentially, when it was reproduced in copies for sale-
it was protected, if at all, by statutory copyright under section 10,
and had to carry a statutory notice. Works such as videotapes that
could not be reproduced in visually perceptible copies might have
common-law copyright, but they could not obtain statutory copy-
right until recently.
Relating these generalities to the usual practices of the major
media, it can be said that:
1) Publishing in print pas perforce within the federal stat-
ute.
2) Music composers used the statute, but not always, be-
cause if they stayed with state law they avoided-until re-
cently-the compulsory recording license that came into
play once a statutorily copyrighted work was recorded.1
4
3) Music makers-performers and recording companies, of
whom we have said nothing up till now-had no federal
rights until 1971, when they got statutory protection
against duplicators."' They were previously enjoying
similar state rights, and still have them in recordings
made before 1972.86
4) Motion picture producers used the statute, although they
might have claimed a state-law performance right so long
as they stuck to leasing their product, and refrained from
selling prints.
8 7
5) Dramatists probably used the statute, although they as-
suredly had a state-law performance right.
6) Broadcasters until recently had no useful access to statu-
34 See notes 71-73 & accompanying text infra.
35 Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e) (Supp. V 1975)); cf. Naw Act
§ 114.
36 See text accompanying notes 177-82 infra.
37 See Nolan, Copyright Protection for Motion Pictures: Limited or Per-
petual?, 18 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 174 (1970).
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tory protection and had to rely on state protection for
their creations.
In a word, the situation was a muddle, even though the creator
of every important literary, musical and artistic work had access
to one or more avenues of protection.
There was at least one issue of principle that disturbed the
constitutional integrity of the dual system. The Constitution con-
fines federal protection to "limited times.""8  Common-law rights
were generally assumed to be perpetual.3" Although nothing
barred a state from limiting duration of such rights, no state in
modern times has done so. If the constitutional policy that in the
end propelled all copyrights into the public domain was a sound
one, it did not seem right that some kinds of producers could ex-
ploit some kinds of works in perpetuity. Judge Learned Hand be-
lieved that it was "the overriding purpose" of the constitutional
clause "to grant only for 'limited Times' the untrammeled ex-
ploitation of an author's 'Writings,'" and further argued that
"Uniformity was one of the principal interests to be gained by
devolving upon the Nation the regulation of this subject."40 Chief
Justice Burger, on the other hand, in validating a state statute
granting copyright protection against duplication of pre-1972
sound recordings, 41 observed that "the exclusive right granted by
a State is confined to its borders. Consequently, even when the
right is unlimited in duration, any tendency to inhibit further prog-
ress in science or the arts is narrowly circumscribed. The chal-
lenged statute cannot be voided for lack of a durational limita-
tion."42  He deprecated the need for uniformity: "The objective
of the Copyright Clause was clearly to facilitate the granting of
rights national in scope,"" and thus to ease the way of authors
and inventors. But there is "enormous diversity" 44 in our society,
and some interests may be "of purely local importance. '45 A state
copyright will serve "to induce new artistic creations within that
State."46 "No conflict will necessarily arise from a lack of uniform
state regulation . . . . Congress, he pointed out, is always em-
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
39 See Strauss, Publication of Unpublished Works, COPYRIGHT OFFICE
STUDY No. 29 at 4 (1957), reprinted in I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 189, 194 (Copy-
right Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed. 1963).
40 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d
Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
41 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
42 Id. at 560-61.
43 Id. at 555.
44 Id. at 557.
45 Id. at 558.
46 Id. at 559.
47 Id. at 560.
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powered to set national standards, to "eschew all protection" for
some writings, to allow state protection, or to accept "concurrent
exercise of the power to grant copyrights."4" As we have seen,
there has been a large range of concurrent exercise under the
1909 Act.
One may prefer either Judge Hand's or the present Court's
assignments of value as to the pervasiveness of time limitations,
and as to whether national uniformity or local diversity is pre-
ferred. Within the loose confines of the clause, these are for Con-
gress to declare authoritatively. In the 1976 revision it has opted
for national uniformity.
II. UNIFICATION BY FIXATION
Section 102 of the New Act accomplishes the unification of
common-law and national copyright. Buttressed by a powerful
preemption provision, section 301,11 section 102 makes simple
fixation the starting point of statutory copyright, 0 rather than pub-
lication with notice. Thus, it must first be established that the
work falls within the coverage of section 102,51 which defines the
subject matter of copyright, in order to preclude state protection.
Section 102(a) provides:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
48 Id. at 559.
49 See notes 110-82 & accompanying text infra.
-50 Section 102 contains substantially the same language as that of the
original draft bill introduced in 1965. Supp. REP. REG. at 4-6, 174; H.R. 4347,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1965). However, an earlier revision proposal did
not reflect the same approach.
In 1961, the Report of the Register, after several years of preliminary study,
proposed that common-law copyright be continued for manuscripts, essentially on
privacy grounds; and that some of the distortions reviewed earlier in this paper
be corrected by making "public dissemination," rather than "publication," the
starting-point of statutory copyright. 1961 REP. REG. at 39-43. This proposal
was not well-received. In the 1965 Supplementary Report the Register wrote:
The focal point of opposition to the Report was its proposal on the
start and length of the copyright term, which lay at the heart of the en-
tire revision program. We had recommended that copyright begin with
the "public dissemination" of a work-a concept that would include pub-
lic performance as well as the distribution of copies and sound record-
ings-and that it last for a first term of 28 years, renewable for a second
term of 48 years. There was very little support for these recommenda-
tions, and there was strong sentiment favoring copyright from creation
of the work, and the term most common in foreign copyright laws, based
on the life of the author and a period of 50 years after his death.
Supp. REP. REG. at x.
Dissatisfaction with "dissemination" as a new dividing-line between common-
law and statutory copyright did not, it appears, spring entirely from distaste for
common-law rights. There was unease about "dissemination" because it was un-
familiar. In any event, the shift to a unified system soon appeared in preliminary
drafts; and it has never faltered. Id. at 82-83, 174-75.
51 If the work is a compilation or derivative work within the meaning of
§ 103, it is within the subject matter of copyright. NEw ACT §§ 103, 301.
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title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.
52
The scope of this pronouncement is initially astonishing to
one who thinks of a copyrighted work as robed in the dignity of
publication with notice. Consider the following examples of the
statutory categories of works of authorship that follow the sen-
tence in section 102 just quoted. Tell yourself firmly that from
the moment of creation and fixation, they are protected by the
New Copyright Act, for they are:
1) literary works: you write a letter;
2) musical works: you compose a song and sing it to a tape
recorder;
3) dramatic works: your children make up a play. When
they perform it, you borrow a camera and make a video-
tape of it;
4) pantomimes and choreographic works: your daughter
performs a modern dance that she has devised. You
make a movie of it;
5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works: you do a week-
end watercolor;
6) motion pictures: you have already made one, of your
daughter's dance. Make another, of highlights of your
son's Little League championship game;
7) sound recordings: you are one of a barbershop quartet,
and tape your rendition of "Sweet Adeline."
All this private trivia in copyright? Yes.5" But if this seems
hard to take, consider that all the described "works" could have
claimed common-law protection, aside from possible difficulties
with the means by which they were recorded 54-- difficulties that
52 Id. § 102. See also id. § 101. The definitions of "created" and "fixed"
are essentially the same: Creation is simply the first fixation of a work, and oc-
curs whenever parts or versions of it are prepared and embodied in a permanent
form. Id.
53 Note that the House Report, the basic piece of legislative history, says that
the standard of originality in § 102 "does not include requirements of novelty, in-
genuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of
copyright protection to require them." H. REP. at 51. Are some of these exam-
ples too minimal or uncreative to claim protection? One has to ask, protection
against whom? Presumably against someone who undertakes to copy one's home
movies or whatever. Against such a person, claims of infringement-if the work
has not been published-would have an appealing element of protection of pri-
vacy. If the work had somehow found a market and been published, then a de-
fendant's competing commercial publication in itself would tend to show that the
work had value.
54 See note 26 supra.
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the statute now dispels by dispensing with any need for direct vis-
ual perception. 55
One rewarding byproduct of the new dispensation is that per-
sons approached because of their supposed expertness in copy-
right can now give a simple answer to the perennial inquiry: "I've
written a novel (poem) (scenario) and I want to copyright it.
What do I do?" The simple answer will be, "Nothing. You al-
ready have a copyright." The catch is that it will be a long time
before lay persons will believe this. They will still want to send
their creation to themselves by registered mail, or do something
equally portentous.
What are other consequences of this ingathering of what
were formerly common-law works and rights? Here is a survey
by types of work.
A. Manuscripts
In considering the usefulness of the new law, we should sep-
arate contemporary manuscripts from historical manuscripts. As
for one's own productions (which may now be on paper, tape, or
for that matter computer cards), after January 1, 1978, the great
benefit will be the decreased risk of unintended divestitive publi-
cation-where one loses common-law rights but has not attached
the notice requisite to gain statutory rights.56 The easing in this
respect is in the requirements for notice rather than in the unified
scheme itself. An authorized publication will still require the
familiar notice, 57 but the opportunity for curing an omission is gen-
erous (it can be done by registration within five years after publi-
cation without notice);58 and the sanctions for errors in form are
mild too.59 Along the way, the author can revise his work; each
time he does so, copyright subsists in this revised version; 0 and
he can make cautious circulation of it. Even if at some point he
has made copies available to the public without attaching a notice
55 See NEW ACT § 101, definitions of "fixed" and "copies."
56 The classic modern case is White v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 957 (1952).
57 NEW ACT § 401. There are some modifications in the notice require-
ments. For example, the year of first publication must be used on all works ex-
cept certain useful articles. Id. § 401(b)(2). Under the 1909 Act, artistic works
did not need the date. 1909 AcT § 19. However, works in statutory copyright by
virtue of publication with notice prior to January 1, 1978, may follow the new or
old notice provisions. NEW ACT, Transitional and Supplementary Provisions
§ 107 (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. 304 note).
58 NEW ACT § 405.
59 Id. § 406.
60 See id. § 101 (definition of "creation").
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-the statutory definition of publication does not give much lee-
way 6 -- he still has five years to retrieve the copyright.
6 2
With historical manuscripts, the problem has been not to pre-
serve copyright, but to get rid of it. Here is one case where the
imposition of the new durational limits, protracted as they are, will
have some bite. The perpetual nature of common-law rights, and
the fact that literary property in the content of a manuscript could
be claimed by others than the possessors of the paper itself, made
scholarly publication of documents often uncomfortable.63 Sup-
pose one had discovered an unpublished poem by John Milton. It
was not likely that descendants of Milton would turn up with valid
literary property claims. But one could never be wholly confi-
dent. The discoverer of a Milton manuscript, however, if he
wants to take no chances, will still have to be patient. He must
wait until January 1, 2003, for common-law rights now in exist-
ence to disappear. This is laid down in section 302, which basic-
ally provides that any pre-existing rights will be subject to the new
term of life-of-the-author-plus-fifty years (or 100 years from crea-
tion in the case of anonymous or pseudonymous manuscripts).
64
Arguments (I believe) had been made that Congress could
not or should not summarily cut off the publication value of old
manuscripts. 5 Suppose, for example, that the heirs of Emily
Dickinson who slowly published her poems still had some locked
away. They would of course still have the right of first publica-
tion. Anyone in lawful possession of a manuscript and the literary
property in it has this right, which should not be viewed as incon-
siderable. But once the poems were published, anyone could
then print them, since the poet died more than fifty years ago. So
the statute gives such a new publication a twenty-five year term,
from January 1, 1978, to avoid any suggestion of an unconstitu-
tional taking.66 It further encourages publication of such buried
treasures by offering another twenty-five year term from December
31, 2002, if publication is made by that date.
67
61 Id. § 101; cf. id. § 405(a).
62 Id. § 405.
63 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3
of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R.
6835, pt. 2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1139 (1965) (testimony of Professor Julian
Boyd about rights in letters to and from Thomas Jefferson). See also id., pt. 3,
at 1549.
64 NEw AcT § 302. See also id. § 303.
65 Under the 1909 Act they could have the full two terms totaling 56 years
from publication. I have not located a statement of the suggested concern.
66 1 take this to be the point of the reference to "constitutional requirements
of due process" in H. REP. at 133.
67 NEW Acr § 303. This protection approximates the two 28-year terms
afforded under the 1909 Act.
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B. Musical Compositions
As we have seen, easy statutory protection has been available
under the old law for unpublished music under section 12.68 Now
the nervous composer does not even need to take these steps. His
situation will be like that of the author of any other form of manu-
script: he will have statutory copyright from fixation. Automatic
statutory protection has a price, however. It will no longer be
possible to exploit the work on phonograph records while claiming
to be free of the compulsory license provision of the statute.69 A
practice of this sort had developed based on the notion that the
distribution of records does not amount to publication of the re-
corded composition, 70 and that the composer could rely on com-
mon-law copyright, free of requirements of the statute. This escape
was cut off by the ingenious opinion of Judge Gurfein in Rosette v.
Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp.,71 in which he argued that Congress
could not have intended such a large loophole by way of section
2. He held that the common-law copyright owner of music dis-
tributed in records must obtain copyright, file the statutory notice
of use, 7  and thus accept compulsory licensing before he could
sue for infringement one who made records of the composition
without a license.7 3  Now the statutory licensing arguments will
prevail once authorized distribution of phonorecords of the work
has occurred.
There is another requirement. The composer who dissemi-
nates his work on records (or tape) must identify himself in "the
registration or other public records of the Copyright Office" be-
fore he can collect royalties under a compulsory license.74  This
requirement smoothes any awkwardness resulting from the per-
sistence of the old vexation: Do phonograph records publish the
composition? Apparently, the composer who makes records still
does not in that way publish the work so as to necessitate a notice,
because the statutory notice is required only on visually percepti-
ble copies. 75  The public filing requirement should serve the func-
tion of a notice on the record.
68 See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
69 NEW Acr § 115.
70 See notes 26, 28 & accompanying text supra.
71 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 546 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir. 1976).
72 See 1909 ACT § 1(e).
73 354 F. Supp. at 1193.
74 NEwAcT§ 115 (c)(1).
7B Id. 401(a). Since "phonorecords" are not "copies," there is no need to
place a § 401 notice on "phonorecords" of the work "to protect the literary or
musical works embodied in the records." H. REP. at 145. The notice require-
ments for phonorecords in § 402 refer only to the protection of the sound record-
ings, that is, the performances or other sounds fixed on them.
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C. Works of Art
The painter and sculptor have long been plagued by ambigui-
ties concerning their artistic property. The unified system largely
clears up two of them. First, the uncertainty whether public ex-
hibition may be a publication that requires a notice to be affixed,
with a risk of loss of copyright if it is not, is categorically resolved.
Artists who are disinclined (or forget) to put a notice on their
paintings may be reassured. The authoritative House Report is
emphatic that, since "publication" is defined as the distribution of
copies7" to the public, and since the definition goes on to say that
"A public performance or display of a work does not of itself con-
stitute publication" (Why the "of itself" hedge?), a notice is un-
necessary.77  Of course the converse is true. As soon as re-
productions of the painting for distribution to the public are made,
or offered to be made, a notice must appear on "all publicly dis-
tributed copies. '' 8
The second ambiguity has concerned the transfer of copy-
right on the sale of the original work. In Pushman v. New York
Graphic Society, Inc.,79 the New York Court of Appeals, with sup-
port from older cases, held that, in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, the "unconditional sale carried with it the transfer of the
common-law copyright and right to reproduce." '  The presump-
tion that copyright followed a transfer was destroyed in New York
by a statute which required an express writing for the right of re-
production to follow the ownership of the work of art."' But of
course doubts would have persisted elsewhere. Since works of art
will now have federal copyright from their creation, the content
of both Pushman and the statute are pre-empted and are now
simply historical data.
Congress regrettably was not as forthright as was the New
York legislature. Section 202 simply echoes the old section 27,82
with more words: transfer "of the copy . . . in which the work
is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted
work embodied in the object . . . ." Again, the weak "of itself'
locution. However, the House Report links this section to section
204(a), a general dictate that "a transfer of copyright ownership,
76 A copy includes the original. NEw ACT § 101 (definition of copy).
77 Id. at § 101; H. REP. at 144. Nor is the sale of a unique work of art
intended to be publication. 122 CONG. REC. H10,875 (daily ed. September 22,
1975) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
78 NEw ACT § 401.
79 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942).
80 Id. at 308, 39 N.E.2d at 251.
81 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 219-g (McKinney Supp. 1976-77). See also
CAL. CIV. CODE § 982(c) (West Supp. 1976).
82 1909 ACT § 27.
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other than by operation of law, is not valid unless" it is in writing.83
Ambiguities of interpretation of contracts and bills of sale may still
arise; but it seems fair to conclude, as did the Report, that at least
the Pushman presumption is reversed.8"
D. Dramatic Works
Common-law playright and its perpetual protection is dead;
long live statutory playright! So might dramatists acclaim, with
more force than felicity, as Ferris v. Frohman is interred. All
fixed dramatic works are now perforce within the statute; but the
rights that it confers are generous ones, covering the entire range
of rights in section 106. Section 110, which deals with "Exemp-
tions of Certain Performances and Displays" encroaches very
lightly on dramatic works. As one scans its subsections, the word
"nondramatic" recurs; the only significant exemption from public
performance rights is for face-to-face teaching activities.8 5 A last-
minute addition exempting special broadcasts to the blind is so
preposterously narrow thpt it serves only to emphasize the full pro-
tection otherwise afforded. 86
E. Motion Pictures
The new statute makes no great change in the copyright sta-
tus of motion pictures. As suggested above,8 7 a movie under the
old law might have rested under common-law rights as long as no
copies of it were ever sold. But of course fixation ends even the
possibility of state law protection; moreover, the definition of pub-
lication now includes distribution by "rental, lease, or lending."88
In any event, industry practice has long relied on statutory copy-
right, which was made specifically available by an amendment of
1912.89 Sound tracks, as we have said,9 ° were of doubtful legiti-
macy under the old statute because they were not visually percep-
tible. But that is no longer a problem. They will now be firmly
tied to their pictures, in law as in fact, by inclusion in the statutory
definition of "motion pictures." '91
83 H. REP. at 23, 124.
84 H. REP. at 124.
85 NEWAcT § 110(1).
86 Id. § 110(9). The dramatic work must have been published at least 10
years prior to the performance to the blind; there can be no purpose of commer-
cial gain: and the exemption applies only to one performance per organization.
87 Text accompanying note 37 supra.
88 NEw AcT § 101.
89 Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5, 37 Stat. 488.
90 See note 32 & accompanying text supra; KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note
28, at 93-94.
91 NEW ACT § 101,
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F. Broadcasting
In contrast to films, the great broadcasting industry and its
works had no secure place in the old statutory scheme,92 and they
are still not specified in section 102. They will now have a choice
of a sort, dependent on fixation. A broadcast-which need not
be over-the-air; the statute speaks of a "transmission" by any me-
dium to another place-is protected by the statute as soon as it
is fixed. Furthermore, a transmission is considered fixed so that
copyright subsists, "if a fixation of the work is being made simul-
taneously with its transmission. '"" Thus, if a broadcaster/trans-
mitter routinely tapes its output, there is automatically a fixation,
and any imbedded works are in copyright. On the other hand,
if a transmission is not fixed, either by oversight, by choice on a
particular occasion, or as a routine matter of economical practice,
then it is not in copyright. It would appear that broadcasters will
need to review their practices about taping with the copyright law
in mind. Of course, much of their material is taped or recorded
before transmission, and thus already in copyright before the
broadcast; the necessity for simultaneous fixation exists only as to
the live components of broadcasting.
For what reasons might a broadcaster, before or after the
event, wish to have a particular program or event in or out of fed-
eral copyright? For one thing, he may prefer the unqualified
rights of the common-law author to the exemptions in the statute
that would be applicable to the broadcast work. These exemp-
tions may not amount to much; but they are set forth in sections
of a complexity worthy of a tax statute. Look at section 118, on
"Use of certain works in connection with non-commercial broad-
casting."94  Sheer incomprehension might push a broadcaster who
had a choice to leave his work unfixed.95
92 See notes 29-33 & accompanying text supra.
93 NEW AcT § 101 (definition of fixed).
94 Id. § 118.
95 Can a transmission, once fixed, be unfixed? This is a puzzle, and it
raises a quizzical point. If for any reason the inadvertent author wants to resort
to common-law rights, e.g., perpetual duration, will he be able to waive, renounce,
or extinguish the fixation? We do not know. The problem of renunciation of
a copyright arose, obscurely, under the 1909 Act, as an
oddity related to the manufacturing clause: an American author pub-
lishes with notice in the United States and then wants to have a second
printing done abroad. The second printing can not be imported. § 107.
Suppose the first publication was a minor one (e.g., in microfilm). Is
there any way to renounce the claim of copyright? See McCannon, The
Manufacturing Clause of the U.S. Copyright Law 34, n.175 (1963) in
2 Studies on Copyright (Fisher Mem. Edition) 1158, which suggests
filing in the Copyright Office a statement of abandonment, and then
presenting this recorded document to Customs.
KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note 28, at 820.
The existence of written scripts in the broadcasting field further complicates
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Another possible reason why a broadcaster might wish to re-
tain common-law rights is to avoid the privilege of fair use, now
given statutory authority and dimensions in section 107. It has
been said, on slight actual authority, that there is no privilege of
fair use in common-law copyright."" This might be so with re-
spect to the classic case of the privately-held manuscript. If, how-
ever, we are talking about a network newscast viewed by millions,
it seems unreal to have the scope of fair use turn on whether the
broadcast was fixed. More than that, it seems legally irrelevant;
for if, as is nowadays maintained, the core of fair use is protected
by the first amendment, 7 that constitutional mantle covers both
state and federal copyright. So perhaps there is no refuge from
fair use.
Why should one have any concern about copyright and fair
use of news broadcasts? After all, it is accepted that the news
itself is not subject to copyright. But broadcasting not only trans-
mits news; it creates news on programs like Meet the Press. It
is of significance for journalists and historians to be able to retrieve
and disseminate the precise words that were said on Meet the
Press, and what Walter Cronkite said or did not say-that is, how
an influential commentator presented his version of the news.
This is not to suggest that a station could simply appropriate a
newscast rather than pay for it. It does suggest considerable
scope for taping broadcasts for study and criticism. 8
the problem. Even if the broadcast itself is not taped, as in the case of a news
broadcast, it is usually read from something. The script constitutes a fixation.
But suppose that the script is promptly discarded-does that cancel the fixation?
Suppose it is kept for a day, a week, and so on? Fixation in broadcasting is still
a fairly elusive concept.
96 See Warner, supra note 33 at 221; SPRING, RISKS AND RIGHTS IN PUB-
LISHING 181 (rev. 2d ed. 1962).
97 See Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guar-
antees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
98 Cf. the unconcluded law suit by CBS against Vanderbilt University. The
University had undertaken what it thought was a public service in taping and pre-
serving major network newscasts. It appears that when Vanderbilt started this
practice in 1963, the networks themselves were not retaining tapes or scripts of
their newscasts. A CBS spokesman said that its concern was primarily to control
the commercial licensing of its newscasts. The suit against Vanderbilt was not
then being pressed. See Copyright Law Revision, Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on H. R. 2223, pt. 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 683-90 (1975)
(testimony of Robert V. Evans) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings on H.R.
2223]; Patterson, Private Copyright and Public Communication: Free Speech
Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1162, 1207 (1975). An outgrowth of all
this is the American Television and Radio Archives Act, NEw ACT, Transitional
and Supplementary Provisions, sec. 113 (to be codified as 2 U.S.C. 170). Also,
NEW ACT § 108(f)(3) authorizes a library or archives to reproduce and distribute
for non-commercial purposes a "limited number of copies" of an "audio-visual
news program." See H. REP. at 77.
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Broadcasting stands out from other forms of expression that
might continue to resort to state law protection of productions that
remain unfixed. There can be unfixed music, drama and dance.99
But their audiences and revenues are meager compared, say, to
the highly rewarded ramblings of a popular sportscaster. The
portions of broadcasting that are likely to remain unfixed consist
largely of talk. It may be helpful to comment on the status of
talk under the new statute.
G. Talk
When are talk, speech and conversations appropriate for ei-
ther statutory or common-law protection? When the talk is struc-
tured, and the result of conscious authorship, and has been written
down, it is eligible for protection under the 1909 statute as a
"lecture, sermon, address or similar production," in which specific
rights were elaborately conferred."' The whole category seems
to have disappeared without a trace in the New Act, although we
are assured that nothing protected by the 1909 Act has been
omitted in the new.' 01  Probably these productions are now
thought of as either literary or dramatic works, protected when
fixed. They can be taped when they are delivered; a prior man-
uscript will now be unnecessary. We move on to less structured
public utterances like the sportscaster's or disc jockey's endless
talk. Is there a difference between talking for a living, and just
talking? The oceans of talk include the carefully premeditated,
the utterly spontaneous, and an infinite range in between. And
a distinction needs to be drawn between the content of talk, and
its style. The latter may be the appropriate subject for a statu-
torily protected sound recording. A monologue, as well as a song,
can qualify as a sound recording once it is fixed. But the protec-
tion is only against duplication, not against imitation or simula-
tion.10 2 It appears that a sound recording, over-simply, will not
protect what you say, only the way you say it.
The mind recoils from the thought of conferring copyright on
most kinds of talk. Major judicial consideration has been devoted
only to conversation, where the problems are compounded by the
fact that more than one speaker contributes to dialogue, with at-
tendant allocations to be made of whatever rights exist. Ernest
99 Dance now has explicit statutory recognition in NEw Acr § 102(a) (4),
bringing "pantomimes and choreographic works" into the categories of copy-
rightable works.
100 1909 AcT §§ 5(c), 1(c).
101 1961 REP. REG. at 11; Supp. REP. REG. at 4-5.
102 NEW AcT § 114(b). The definition of sound recording, id. § 101,
includes "spoken" sound.
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Hemingway's estate claimed common-law rights in conversations
of the famous writer with his friend A. E. Hotchner and others;
Hotchner had made careful notes and used much of Hemingway's
talk in a memoir. The New York Court of Appeals held that Hem-
ingway had implicitly authorized the publication.1 03  Chief Judge
Fuld's thoughtful opinion goes on to suggest that for conversa-
tional speech "there should be a presumption that the speaker has
not reserved any common-law rights unless the contrary strongly
appears" and that
it would, at the very least, be required that the speaker in-
dicate that he intended to mark off the utterance in question
from the ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt
it as a unique statement and that he wished to exercise control
over its publication. In the conventional common-law copy-
right situation, this indication is afforded by the creation of
the manuscript itself. It would have to be evidenced in some
other way if protection were ever to be accorded to some
forms of conversational dialogue.'
0 4
One would immediately suppose that a concurrent fixation,
with appropriate "prefatory words"'' 5 could be one way of so indi-
cating-and of course that would now throw the talk into statutory
copyright, if it were to be protected at all. Is it enough that the
speaker thinks well enough of his talk to record it, with an indica-
tion that he intends to have copyright? Perhaps so. Like many
of the homely examples that were suggested at the beginning of
this paper, no harm is done; no burden is at that point imposed
on the Copyright Office; it is just a way, perhaps vainglorious, of
saying, "This is mine." It is only when someone is charged with
copying that questions of authorship and originality have to be
faced. There is also a concern that claims of copyright might be
103 Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244
N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1969).
104 Id. at 349, 244 N.E.2d at 256, 296 N.Y.S. at 779. Other cases advance
the solution only slightly. Jenkins v. News Syndicate Co., 128 Misc. 284, 219
N.Y.S. 196 (Sup. Ct. 1926), held that oral discussion by plaintiff of columns she
proposed to write for defendant could not then be published by defendant as inter-
views. CBS v. Documentations Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d
809 (Sup. Ct. 1964), held that defendant could not reproduce on a phonograph
record a news broadcast by plaintiff's employee; this misappropriated his voice and
style of talking. Cf. Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337
N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. 1972), which held that Audio could reproduce on a rec-
ord a public press conference held by Elvis Presley. Presley was not performing,
and what he said was newsworthy.
Distinguish cases where A's talk as recreated by B in a copyrighted book is
copied by C. B has a cause of action against C. Harris v. Miller, 50 U.S.P.Q.
(B.N.A.) 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Marvin Worth Prod. v. Superior Films Corp., 319
F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Dunlap, Copyright Protection for Oral
Works-Expansion of the Copyright Law into the Area of Conversations, 20 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 285 (1973).
lo Dunlap, note 104 supra.
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advanced to suppress speech that the public has an interest in.10 6
This takes us back to the discussion of significant elements of
broadcasting talk, as distinct from the mindless time-filling chatter
that nobody cares about anyway. If the talk has in it something
newsworthy, its news elements and even its actual content can be
opened up by fair use.
H. Summary
On the whole, one may conclude that the unified system
takes away nothing of major importance from the rights that state
law has afforded the kinds of works that needed or whose creators
chose state law protection. Obviously it takes away perpetual pro-
tection, in accordance with a constitutionally-mandated policy. It
subjects the works that now perforce come under the statute to
a variety of exemptions, each representing an articulated policy or
at least an understandable compromise. This is all to the good:
Much of the common-law rights rhetoric was nothing more than
rhetoric; it inflated supposed natural rights of authors and prop-
erty, and was unregarding of the policy considerations that per-
vade the statute. For example, we have noted the alleged ab-
sence in common-law copyright of a privilege of fair use, the play
in the joints of copyright that keeps the whole structure from intol-
erable rigidity. A great advantage of the unified system will be
that fair use, now given statutory recognition, 10 7 will be available
in a uniform way.
Above all, what the statute confers on authors that some of
them could not have obtained before is access to the federal
courts'0 and to their heavy battery of statutory remedies, such as
nationally enforceable injunctions, minimum damages, and discre-
tionary attorney's fees.'0
III. WHAT Is LEFT TO STATE LAW BY SECTION 301?
The preceding parts of this paper discuss works that will
come within the unified system as soon as they are fixed, along
with those, such as improvised musical compositions, that will still
be left to state law because they are created without authorized
fixation. All this flows from section 102(a), the fundamental
declaration that copyright subsists "in original works of authorship
106 See Thor, The Interview and the Problem of Common Law Copyright in
Oral Statements, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 88 (1969).
107 NEW Acr § 107.
108 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (Supp. V 1975).
109 NEw AcT. §§ 502, 504(c), 505. To survey systematically the benefits
and burdens of federal copyright rules would require a tour through the entire
statute, an exercise beyond the scope of this Article.
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fixed in any tangible medium of expression." Towering over all
the act, however, is section 301, the equally fundamental preemp-
tive provision. Section 301 precludes state protection of works in
tangible form which fall within the subject matter of the New Act
when the state attempts to provide protection equivalent to rights
specified in the Act.
Although the preemptive force of section 301 has been, as
the Committee Reports have unfailingly stated since 1966, "one
of the bedrock provisions of the bill," 1 0 its language was altered
in recent years, and it was tinkered with on the floor of the House
just before passage and transmission to conference. Section 301
has had a curious trajectory. While its language, as we shall see,
was moving in the direction of a less detailed and more abstract
content, giving ever less guidance as to congressional intentions,
the attitude of the Supreme Court with respect to preemption was
moving in the other direction. The messages from the Court sig-
nalled that Congress would have to assert its undoubted power to
preempt, or else the States could act.
The major decisions of the Supreme Court in the twin cases
that have come to be known as Sears-Compco" 1 had just been
decided when section 301 was first introduced as part of the 1965
revision bill. Sears-Compco declared a strong policy preference
in favor of competitive copying unhampered by state law, unless
the subject matter was explicitly given protection by the federal
patent laws. Since the articles involved-pole lamps and fluores-
cent lighting fixtures-failed to qualify for either design or
mechanical patents, and design copyright was not sought, the hold-
ings of the cases did not directly control copyright matters. But
a unanimous Court, through Justice Black's opinions, did declare
that
when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright,
state law may not forbid others to copy that article. To for-
bid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing
federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public do-
main. 1 2
These decisions were interpreted generously by some federal
110 H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1966); H. REP. at 129.
111 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco.
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 1 cite Sears-Compco al-
most nostalgically, mindful that they were simultaneously limited and reaffirmed
in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), and are being brushed aside by
inferior courts, e.g., Truck Equipment Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 164 (1976).
112 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting. 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
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courts of appeals"' (and less enthusiastically by state courts
whose power was diminished)."' They were widely understood
to leave unprotected works that could fall within the copyright-
patent clause, but that were unmentioned in the statutes. Conse-
quently, when the key words of section 301 read, "All rights in
the nature of copyright in works that come within the subject mat-
ter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . .are gov-
erned exclusively by this title," one could expect that section 301
would be given a broad preemptive reading.
But in 1973 came the decision in Goldstein v. California,115
holding in essence that states could create copyrights in subject
matter that Congress had not dealt with. Goldstein was followed
in 1974 by Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.," 6 which took a simi-
larly indulgent view of the power of the states to protect trade se-
crets in inventions, even if the subject matter might have been
patentable. These two decisions, it must be said, practically re-
versed the presumption of preemption put forward in Sears-
Compco, and called upon Congress to speak up if it chose to pre-
empt.
Yet, in the 1975 Senate version of section 301 the key lan-
guage of the section was changed to:
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that ...
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103 . . .are governed exclusively by this
title.'
1 7
Did these changes alter the scope of preemption, even atmospher-
ically? If they did, in what direction? The earlier language, "in
the nature of," sounds more encompassing than "equivalent to";..8
and the new version brings in, as the referent for equivalency, the
rights "specified by section 106"-but it is the "general scope of
113 E.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335
F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). Compare Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (lst Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1007, with DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499
(1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 856 (1976).
114 See Bricker, Thirty Months After Sears and Compco, 14 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'Y 293 (1967); Note, Goldstein v. California: Breaking Up Federal
Copyright Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1974).
115 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
116 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
117 S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1976).
118 Equivalent can mean either "equal" or "similar"; but "Equivalent,
referring to two or more, means not identical but having the same worth, effect,
force or meaning." American Heritage Dictionary, ed. W. Morris 1147 (syno-
nyms under "same") (1969).
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copyright as specified." Does "specified" mean anything more
than "listed"? Does "general scope" bring back the flavor of "in
the nature of"?
These questions may be simply captious. The Senate Com-
mittee report, in commenting on the changes, continued the asser-
tion found in earlier reports that the preemptive principle was "in-
tended to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal language
possible," and added that the section and its analysis "have been
modified . . . so as to more exactly define the intent of the Con-
gress." '119 What the drafters did in 1975 was to make the lan-
guage of section 301(a) symmetrical with the related portions of
section 301(b) which saves from preemption
rights and remedies under the common law or statutes of any
State with respect to:
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
203 . . . or
(2) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are
not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section
106.120
Sections 301(a) and 301(b) now appear to be mirror im-
ages. One part states the scope of federal preemption. The
other says in the same words, with "not" added, that what is not
preempted is left to the states. More than a little redundancy
seems to be present. But redundancy can be simply a mode of
emphasis, and there is more to section 301 than these verbal exer-
cises suggest.
A. Equivalent Subject Matter
What kinds of works are left to the states? Literally, those
that are not literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial,
graphic, sculptural, motion pictures or sound recordings (section
102), or compilations or derivative works (section 103). These
are the specified subject matters. What is left? Is it possible that,
after the major unification that is the keystone of the New Act,
a considerable volume of intellectual production is in fact not pre-
empted? And if it is not preempted, what are the implications
of state power to afford protection?
119 S. RaP. at 114.
120 Section 301(b) had been expanded somewhat from its earlier version, by
substituting "common law or statutes of any State" for "the law of any State" in
the initial clause, and inserting "legal and equitable" before "rights" in subsection
(3). S. REP. at 20. These additions merely clarify. Changes in subsection (1)
with respect to unpublished and unfixed works are discussed at note 153 infra.
Subsection (2) saves any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced
before January 1, 1978. S. REP. at 20.
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At this point it seems necessary to recall elementary proposi-
tions about the importance of the public domain in copyright and
patent law. Most of the attention devoted to the New Act (and
the old one for that matter) has focused on the scope of protec-
tion. Emphasis on the protected domain leads to neglect of the
public domain. There are masses of writings and discoveries that
are open to the public-for good reasons. If these works were
once under copyright or patent, and the statutory monopolies have
expired, it is of the essence of these grants that what they formerly
protected is now open. Or the works may never have qualified
for protection, either because they did not meet qualitative stand-
ards (relatively high in patent law, low in copyright), because they
did not fall into statutory categories, or because they were of a
degree of generality that was not thought appropriate for protec-
tion. A familiar way of referring to this last grouping is the fre-
quent assertion that in copyright ideas are not protected, only their
expression.1 It is not only ideas that circulate in the public do-
main without paying toll. All sorts of literary and artistic products
are likewise open; and this helps to satisfy another vital interest:
the national policy pressing toward competition as the best way
our economy knows of satisfying wants efficiently and therefore
cheaply. "The competitive mandate," Professor Goldstein's tell-
ing phrase from another incarnation,122 was the foundation for
Sears-Compco.
What has this to do with preemption? Are not the states as
capable of protecting the public domain as is the Congress? The
answer, from my observation, is no. Suitors before state courts
and legislatures are interested in extending the protected domain;
121 The problems of preemption in relation to the public domain are ably
explored in Comment, Copyright Law Revision and the Kewanee Preemption
Issue: Is There a Doctrine in the House?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1976),
the author of which had "encouragement" from Professor Goldstein. Id. at 609
n.1. I have some reservations about the Comment's public-domain "matrix," but
this is not the place to explore them. The Comment is especially useful (by my
lights) in that it extracts from Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 546
(1974), a test for state power requiring first that the material be patentable or
copyrightable (in a qualitative sense), and second that the state law must further
federal policies. Comment, supra, at 628 et seq. This is rather more cautious
than the sweeping language in Kewanee that "The only limitation on the States
is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not conflict with
the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress." 416 U.S. at 479. For
another attempt to confine Kewanee, arguing inter alia that it ignored desirable
limits (e.g., durational) on the scope of relief that should be available in state
courts, consult Stem, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law
After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 927 (1974). See also Note, The Pre-
emption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
122 Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF.
L. REV. 873 (1971).
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and one has to look hard to find state statutes or decisions running
counter to these pressures. Congress is of course equally be-
sieged by interests seeking protection. But it hears other voices,
notably the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice; and
it naturally takes a national view, and is less swayed by the sup-
posed local interests that Chief Justice Burger found deserving in
Goldstein v. California.
Congress can and does preempt works of authorship, forcing
them into the public domain as well as into the protected domain;
and some reasonable implication is permissible to find that it has
done so. One substantial species of preemption occurs when the
prospective subject matter is entwined with other kinds of works
that Congress has embraced. Then it may be protectively pre-
empted. For example, there has long been a concern in the
broadcasting and motion picture industries that fictional or drama-
tic characters lacked copyright protection against appropriation by
a competitor.1 23  When creations that catch the fancy of the view-
ing public are so valuable, the search for security persists. It has
consequently been suggested that since characters are not among
the works specified in section 102, they are therefore open to state
protection. 121 I would say that this argument fails, simply because
characters all emerge from books, dramas, or movies. They are
accordingly only a subset of these classes of preempted works.
A more complex example, pointing toward a verdict of pre-
emption without protection, is found in the current attempt to
bring within copyright protection the design of typefaces.' 2 5 This
may well be an instance where changing technology has created
a need for some incentive to investment that did not earlier exist.
When the realization of a type designer's drawings required an ex-
pensive set of molds for an expensive and monopolized machine,
the Linotype, copying was unrewardingly expensive, and some re-
ward did go to the type designer. Now, however, photographic
composition has swept the field. It is said to be so easy to copy
a typeface that few are willing to take the trouble to design one.' 26
The Register of Copyrights, having first proposed rule making on
this subject (the existing regulations are interpreted to exclude
123 This concern arose after Warner Bros Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954); see KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note
28, at 308-12.
124 See Brylawski, Protection of Characters--Sam Spade Revisited, 22
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 77, 91 (1974); Rothenberg, Some New Problems in
Motion Picture Copyright Law, 21 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 214 (1974).
125 See Nimmer, The Subject Matter of Copyright Under the Act of 1976,
24 UCLA L. REv. 978, 1016-24 (1977).
126 These observations stem in part from a helpful class presentation by
Alvin Eisenman, Professor of Graphic Design in the Yale School of Art.
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typefaces and typography generally), 11 7 acceded to arguments
that the question was one for Congress to deal with.' 28 After a
day of hearings in 1975,129 the House Committee in its Report
said that it had "considered, but chosen to defer, the possibility
of protecting the design of typeface." 1 0  There are several rea-
sons why the committee might well hesitate. Type is a "useful
article." It also looks like a graphic work, and thus falls within
section 102(a)(5). "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"
have been given a narrow statutory definition that excludes the
"design of a useful article" unless the design can exist "inde-
pendently of the utilitarian aspects of the article.''1 1  In addition
to the definitional limitations, Congress was basically unsure about
the scope of exclusive rights in "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" to which it spoke in section 113 with remarkable hesi-
tancy.' 32
Furthermore, spokesmen for writers objected to creating ex-
clusive rights in type design, in part because of the mixups that
might occur, in a printed work, with the rights of the literary au-
thor.133 This may seem ungenerous on the part of writers; but
it is a position that Congress is entitled to consider; it may in the
end conclude that another slice of exclusive rights should not be
carved from a not-very-large pie.
With these and other considerations at issue, I submit that
it should not be said, as the court did in Goldstein about old re-
cordings, that Congress has not attended to the matter, so as to
leave it to the states. The House Committee is attending to it.
At least until some substantial span of years of inattention follows,
I would say that states must keep hands off typefaces.
Section 113 especially does not let us escape history. If, as
I have argued, typefaces are preempted and not protected, be-
cause Congress is in the process of attending to them, recall the
situation of the designers of clothing, notably women's dresses,
who have been beating on the door and have been denied admis-
127 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1976).
128 See 1975 Hearings on H.R. 2223, supra note 98, at 1008-09 (letter from
Register of Copyrights to Rep. Kastenmeier, June 6, 1975).
129 Id. 1008-238.
130 H. REP. at 55.
131 NEw AcT § 101. This definition, expanded in the 1976 bill from
earlier versions, appears to be derived from Regulations of the Copyright Office,
37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1976).
132 See NEw ACr § 113(b), referring to the statutory and common law in
effect on December 31, 1977, as the source for rights in works that portray useful
articles.
133 See 1975 Hearings on H.R. 2223, supra note 98, at 1194-91 (statement on
behalf of Authors League of America in the Nov. 6, 1974, hearings before the
Register).
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sion to copyright protection for half a century.' Could it now
be said that the New York courts are free to create a copyright
in dress designs because they are not works specified in section
102? I should think not. Congress, as we have just seen, contin-
ues to be troubled about many aspects of protecting (or not pro-
tecting) the design of useful articles. Another part of the revision
bill that the House declined to enact at this time (and the Senate
acquiesced) was the whole of Title II, a separable law on "Orna-
mental Design of Useful Articles" that has been around even longer
than the copyright bill, and has passed the Senate five times.' 35
The House Committee has doubts whether the proposed design
protection, though it looks like copyright and sounds like copy-
right, should be administered with copyright.'3 6 Meanwhile, al-
though frenzied copying is the regular tempo of the clothing
industry, there has been no want of private investment in the
production of creative apparel.
The foregoing are examples of kinds of works that I consider
to be preempted into the public domain until Congress acts further
on them, even though it could be argued that they are not "speci-
fied" in sections 102 or 103. There are also what I will call levels
of authorship that are public-domain preempted. One is the high-
level paradise of ideas, concepts, and principles. The other is the
low-level inferno of things too small or routine for copyright.
Paradise cannot be monopolized. The Court recalled ap-
provingly in Goldstein v. California what Justice Brandeis said:
"The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions
-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-be-
come, after voluntary communication to others free as the air to
common use."' 37  Chief Justice Burger went on to observe that
"There is no fixed immutable line to tell us" what becomes
free. 3 " The drafters made a sweeping attempt in section 102(b):
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
134 See KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note 28, at 255-57, 263.
135 See H. REP. at 50.
136 It was deleted for further study in the 95th Congress. H. REP. at 50;
CONF. REP. at 82. 'It would in any event have excluded "three-dimensional fea-
tures of shape and surface" of apparel. S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. II, § 202
(e) (1976). S. REP. at 39. I suspect that the opponents of federal design protec-
tion for clothing would be astonished if it developed that their success had left
the industry open to state protective regulations.
137 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) (quoting the dissenting opinion in International
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)).
188 Id,
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form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work."' 39
The Committee Report rather downgrades this resounding
statement, saying that it only restates, "in the context of the new
single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy be-
tween expression and idea remains unchanged."' 4 °  I would sug-
gest that this dichotomy reaches beyond the federal system to pro-
hibit any monopolization of ideas, procedures, and the like. Thus,
some processes and discoveries are within the guarded monopoly
of the patent laws. But patent policy, which also tries to maintain
qualitative levels of invention, and limits its monopolies to a mere
seventeen years, firmly excludes "scientific truths," "mental proc-
esses," and "phenomena of nature."'' This policy surely cannot
be circumvented by letting a state protect such discoveries. A
policy barring protection of ideas, themes and historical knowl-
edge, is even more necessary for copyright, with its modest stand-
ards of originality, its prolonged duration, and its willingness to re-
ward unimaginative industry expended on compiling facts.' 42 If
a state were to attempt to confer a monopoly on "William Emp-
son's discovery of the importance of ambiguity, Gerald Manley
Hopkins' discovery of sprung rhythm, and Bach's tempering of the
chromatic scale,"' it would clash hopelessly with the congres-
sional scheme and, I would contend, with freedom of speech.
144
Fortunately, state law does not in practice invade these celes-
tial realms. The inferno that I mentioned is a busier place. It
is full of little imps called titles, slogans, configurations, and trade
dress. These are ordinarily considered not part of copyright; but
they may have a legitimate function as distinctive designations of
the source of a copyrightable work, or of anything else. In this
function, they are siblings to trade-marks, and their deceptive or
confusing trade-symbol use can be enjoined. 4 ' Even the Sears-
139 NEW ACT § 102(b).
140 H. REP. at 57.
141 Phrases quoted from older cases in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972) (denying patentability, under the statute, of a computer program).
142 Telephone directories are such an example. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHUR-
RIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, ch. 2 (1967); Gorman, Copyright Protection for the
Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963). The dif-
fering standards for patent and copyright, stemming from the first statutes in
1790, are cogently sketched by Judge Frank in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
143 These elegant examples are taken from a discusison of patent preemption
in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18 n.7, Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
144 Cf. Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv.
983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970).
145 See KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note 28, at 612-49; NIMMER, supra note 29,
at § 34, for a clear discussion of the status of titles.
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Compco court so recognized. 1" But it would be another matter
to say that since federal copyright custom does not protect them
from competitive use other than as trademarks, a state may do
SO.
1 4 7
The situation is similar for other inhabitants of the nether re-
gions. Take, for example, simple outlines or synopses for larger
works as yet unwritten or unfilmed. These can have considerable
value if they can be treated somewhat like trade secrets, and made
the subject of an express contract or of avowed confidential dis-
closure reasonably implying a contract to pay for their use. 148  But
the pressure for protection of these "ideas" sometimes pushes
courts close to copyright, that is, to a recognition of literary prop-
erty.149  Is this allowable? Are these not embryonic literary
works, and if so is not this statement from the House Report rele-
vant?
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter
categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States
from protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory
copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality
to qualify, or because it has fallen into the public domain. 150
Finally, what about miscellaneous works that are thought to
be "lacking in originality?" Is it possible that a state can protect
unoriginal works such as common slogans, simple color combina-
tions and short musical phrases? How can a federal public do-
main be maintained if these creatures from the lower depths are
labelled property and alowed to levy toll on those who copy
them?15'
With considerably more force than in the 1909 Act, Congress
has now made a general preemptive statement. To find whether
it has attended to a particular area, either to protect it or leave
it open to competition, or leave it to regulation by the states, courts
will naturally look first to section 301 and then to sections 102
146 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
'47 Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr.
118 (2d Dist. 1971) (the Sears-Compco doctrine precludes protection of a song
title on misappropriation grounds; likelihood of confusion must be shown).
148 See Meadow, Television Formats: The Search for Protection, 20 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 73 (1972).
149 See, e.g., Galanis v. Procter & Gamble Corp., 153 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
150 H. REP. at 131.
151 Again, a state (or the federal trademark law) may protect some of these
productions to the extent that they acquire trademark significance. For an ex-
treme example of federal trademark protection of a slogan, see Application of
Marriott Corp., 517 F.2d 1364 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ("We Smile More" held registra-
ble, despite a refusal by the Arizona Court of Appeals to recognize exclusive
rights in Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 16 Ariz. App. 459, 494 P.2d 64
(1972)).
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and 103. But I suggest that they will have to look further, to the
definitions in section 101, to the legislative history (notably in the
House Report), and always to the pages of history. The Supreme
Court, as it often does, has been rewriting history,152 but not in
a way that inhibits the Congress; and it is my view that Congress,
in making a broad preemptive declaration, did not intend to turn
over to the states any significant pieces of the public domain.
B. Equivalent Rights
This discussion of section 301 has so far dwelt on the kinds
of works that are or are not preempted. 15 But the section itself
speaks primarily of rights. Tht rights that are free of preemption
are those that are not "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106."
This clause sounds a little more expansive than the "works" clause
because of the "general scope" phrase tucked in with "specified."
Until the very last hour of the long legislative process, the statute
also furnished a catalog of non-equivalent rights left to the states,
or rather of kinds of activities that could be repressed because they
would invade non-equivalent rights. It came at the end of section
301(b)(3), and mentioned "breaches of contract, breaches of
152 Especially in Goldstein v. California; see Brown, Publication and Pre-
emption in Copyright Law: Elegiac Reflections on Goldstein v. California, 22
UCLA L. REV. 1022 (1975).
153 Major attention no longer needs to be given to § 301(b)(1), "Subject
matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." NEW AcT § 301(b)(1). The "subject matter" clause
now simply restates § 301(a). Until the 1975 changes to § 301, it read "unpub-
lished material that does not come within the subject matter of copyright." SuPP.
REP. REG. at 232. Of what significance is the change from "unpublished mate-
rial" to "subject matter"? Presumably one should now infer that exempted subject
matter may be either published or unpublished, so far as Congress is concerned,
despite the strong tradition that publication divests common-law rights. The dis-
appearance of "unpublished material" undercuts an argument I made that the ex-
emption of unpublished material implied the preemption of published material not
within the subject matter of § 102. See Brown, supra note 152, at 1050.
As for unfixed works, there is an ambiguity in the connective "including,"
but it apparently is of no significance. The House Report is clear that unfixed
works generally are not preempted. H. REP. at 52, 131. This leaves to state law,
as has been discussed earlier in this Article, the task of protecting from unau-
thorized recording and reproduction, and from other forms of imitation and ex-
ploitation, "choreography that has never been filmed or notated, an extemporane-
ous speech, "original works of authorship" communicated solely through conversa-
tions or live broadcasts, and a dramatic sketch or musical composition improvised
or developed from memory and without being recorded or written down." Id. at
131. But states have no obligation to protect an unfixed work, for example, a con-
versation that has not been identified as a work of authorship. See Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771
(1968); notes 103-05 & accompanying text supra.
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trust, invasion of privacy, defamation and deceptive trade practices
such as passing off and false representation."'1 54 These of course
were all familiar wrongs with familiar applications to literary and
artistic properties. Sometimes state courts pushed them rather far
in the direction of creating rights close to those of the statutory
scheme. Thus the desire of celebrities to exclude others from
publishing their names and faces in advertisements, without pay-
ing for the privilege, became an invasion of privacy.'55 Or a court
would reach out to protect an idea not substantial enough for copy-
right by finding an "implied in law" contract barring its use' 56-
that is, a non-contract imposed on a non-contracting party. But
by and large, discernible and manageable boundaries separated
these rights from copyright.
The 1975 rewriting of section 301 enlarged the catalog.
"Trespass" and "conversion" crept in, venerable and perhaps
harmless common-law torts. "Rights against misappropriation not
equivalent to any of such exclusive rights"' 5 was the major addi-
tion to the list of activities that states could control. Even with
the reiteration of "not equivalent," suspicions were aroused.
Some people are suspicious of the very word "misappropria-
tion."' To them it suggests not a euphemism for theft, but a
shapeless tort that releases powerful anti-competitive impulses, ra-
tionalized by scriptural admonitions against reaping where one has
not sown. Indeed, the 1966 House Report said flatly that misap-
propriation was "nothing more than copyright protection under
another name," and that section 301 was intended to preempt
it.1 9  But in 1,975 it was not preempted, but specifically ex-
empted from preemption. The 1975 Senate Report spoke of giv-
ing state law flexibility to curb appropriation of facts "constituting
'hot' news, whether in the traditional mold of International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), or in the newer
form of data uptakes from scientific, business or financial data
bases."' 0  It went on about sanctions against cryptographically
breaching security arrangements, accessing proprietors' data, in-
tercepting laser transmissions, and making unauthorized printouts
154 H. REP. at 24.
155 See, e.g., Palmer v. Schonborn Enterprises, 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d
458 (Ch. 1967).
156 See P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES, CASES AND MATERIALS 69 (1973); NIMMER, supra note 29, § 168.
'57 That is, to the exclusive rights in NEw Acr § 106. The additions were
made in S. 22 as submitted in S. REP.
158 See, e.g., Brown, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1216, 1227 (1964).
159 H. R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 129 (1966).
100 S. REP. at 116.
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from cathode ray tube displays-all quite mystifying to pre-IBM
minds. There was no further explanation.' 6 '
One can however surmise the kind of invasion the Commit-
tee was talking about. Suppose that an oil company has made
thousands of seismic (underground explosive) tests to seek out
oil-bearing formations. It has analyzed these and stored them in
a central computer.'1 2 It transmits data from this geological bank
to many of its minions, and to consultants and others with whom
it shares information on a confidential basis. It is understandably
concerned that a competitor will illicitly intercept some of these
messages. Very well; but why does it need a veiled exception
from copyright preemption? All this is surely protected by trade
secret law; it is like a valued customers' list, grown electronic and
expensive. 6 3  If, however, the proponents of this amendment
wanted to authorize state court controls on published "data bases,"
they should have been more open about their problems, and ex-
plained why copyright is inadequate."
They might then have not aroused agents of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice, who tend to be among those
who mistrust misappropriation remedies. They need remember
-161 If it is possible to adduce a legislative history of a legislative history,
the paragraph in S. REP. paraphrased above seems to have its genesis in an Ameri-
can Bar Association Committee Report. A.B.A. SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK
AND COPYRIGHT LAW, REPORTS TO BE PRESENTED AT [AUG. 1975] MEETING, RE-
PORT OF COMM. No. 309, COPYRIGHT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 177, 180-82 (1975).
This report deprecates the House Committee statement about misappropriation,
text accompanying note 159 supra, raises the alarms about "data uptakes," and
proposes the reinforcing addition of trespass and conversion to the catalog in NEW
ACT § 301(b)(3).
The ABA Report also explains the proposed addition of what is now NEW
AcT § 301(d), that "nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under any other Federal statute." Some of the reasons are cautionary, e.g., to re-
assure that the new Copyright Act does not override other federal statutes, such
as the patent law. One is forehanded: "to facilitate the proper demarcation be-
tween the Copyright Act and the enlarged misappropriation provisions (Sec. 43(a)
(3) and (4)) of the Lanham Act proposed under Sec. 7 of the Unfair Competi-
tion Bill, S.31, 94th Cong." Id. at 181. The congressional reports say nothing
about § 301(d). The ABA Report concludes with a suggested redraft of § 301(b),
which is that adopted by the Senate. Id. at 182.
162 See Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, supseded, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1968).
163 See, as to customer's lists as a conventional type of trade secret, Heyman
A.R. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1963); as to improper means in dis-
covering a trade secret, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-759 (1938).
164 With respect to computerized data that are not attempted to be kept
secret, the problem may be that the material is quite open, like stockmarket quo-
tations, and a claimant of protection wants to protect his diligent service of col-
lecting and disseminating it, see Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co.,
198 U.S. 236 (1905); or it may be like a computer program, where the developer
of the program seeks his reward not from copiers, but from users of the program.
See Brown, Property Rights Under the New Technology, in COMPUTERS, COM-
MUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 189 (M. Greenberger ed. 1971).
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no farther back than the facts in Sears-Compco, where a court
(and worse a federal court,"0 5 but purporting to apply state law)
in effect said to the plaintiffs, "We find you have no claims to
patents, but never mind; your designs are being copied and mis-
appropriated, so we will give you a common-law monopoly of in-
definite duration." Accordingly, the Antitrust Division, when the
bill was about to pass the Senate in February 1976, proposed that
the misappropriation clause be deleted. 1 6 Nothing happened.
Then the Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, in
presenting to the House Committee the views of the Department
on a number of last-minute matters, went beyond the argument
that to exempt misappropriation remedies was anticompetitive.
He expressed concern that other items in the catalog of tolerated
state remedies might also be used "to nullify preemption," and
proposed that the entire catalog be deleted. 167  Again, no re-
sponse. Then, when the bill was before the House for passage
in September, with its managers keeping a fairly tight rein on floor
amendments, Congressman Seiberling (D.-Ohio) moved to strike
"including" and everything following in section 301(c). He
tersely made severe animadversions on misappropriation, citing the
Justice Department's position. But he reassured Congressman
Railsback (R.-Ill.) that he was not trying to change existing law
in certain states that recognize misappropriation. Congressman
Railsback then accepted the amendment for his side. Chairman
Kastenmeier explained that the Justice Department position was
not made known to the Committee until the last day of markup
(Mr. Seiberling interjected: "I understand"), and accepted the
amendment on his side. The amendment was agreed to. 60 The
Senate conferees also accepted it.'0 9 So there is no catalog of rec-
ognized state remedies in the New Act. Of such is the legislative
process.
Perhaps, as the Department of Justice feared, the tail of sec-
tion 301(b)(3) might have wagged the whole preemptive dog.
But now the tail has been cut off. Are we then to infer that states
are not free to enforce contracts with respect to works in copy-
right, or to enjoin the passing-off of an inferior movie as the work
105 The Seventh Circuit, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d
26 (1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313
F.2d 115 (1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
166 Letter from Asst. Att'y Gen. T. E. Kauper to Senator Hugh Scott (Feb.
13, 1976), reprinted in 122 CONG. REC. S2042 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1976).
167 Letter from Asst. Att'y Gen. M. M. Uhlmann to Chairman Robert
Kastenmeier, at 3-7 (July 27, 1976), on file at the UCLA Law Review office.
168 122 CONG. REc. H10,910 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
109 CONF. REP. at 79.
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of Mark Twain?"' Surely not. Here also, as with issues of pre-
empted works, there is a lot of history to draw on, and there is
guidance in the statute beyond the slender enumeration of rights
in section 106.
As a general proposition, I think it can be said that section
301's reference to the rights specified in section 106 must em-
brace all the rest of Chapter 1 of the Act, that is, sections 107
through 118, because, as their headings show, they are all con-
cerned with either "limitations on exclusive rights" or the "scope
of exclusive rights." Chapter 1 really has a quite elegant fine-
boned skeleton, even if its flesh is bloated by elaborate detail, and
layers of compromises on compromises.' 7 '
Take, as a stark example of how one must read beyond sec-
tions 102 and 106, the recent addition to federal law of rights in
sound recordings. These are carefully confined, in section 114,
to rights against unauthorized duplicating (or rearrangement) of
the sounds in a recorded performance. They "do not include any
right of performance under section 106(4). "1172 A diligent effort
has been mounted in recent years to confer on record makers the
right to extract royalties, notably from broadcasters, for the com-
mercial playing of the records. It has not succeeded, although
the question is still a live one.173  Since a performance right is
fundamentally part of section 106, I should think it clear that a
state cannot create such a right, and require radio stations to pay
record makers.
Similarly, section 114 withholds any right to prevent an "in-
dependent fixation . . . even though such sounds imitate or simu-
late those in the copyrighted sound recording. ' 174  Since the stat-
ute denies relief against what in any other context might be in-
fringement-certainly it would be so if someone "simulated" the
musical composition that was being performed-then a state can-
not create such a right.175  But if it can be established that a simu-
lated performance is being passed off as, say, the authentic sound
of Artie Shaw, then a state has its usual authority to repress this
kind of deceptive trade practice. 176
170 Cf. Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir.
1951).
171 "It has been said that this bill is a compromise of compromises," 122
CONG. REC. H10,877 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Railsback).
172 NEw ACT § 114(a).
173 See Brown, supra note 152, at 1047 n.118; 122 CONG. REC. S2044
(daily ed. Feb. 19, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Williams of N.J.).
174 NEW ACT § 114(b).
'75 This outcome is anticipated by Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
176 Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975). Artie Shaw objected to the re-creation of his arrangements
11031977]
HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA L. Rev. 1103 1976-1977
UCLA LAW REVIEW
There is a curious reverse twist to these preemptions in the
case of pre-1972 sound recordings. The 1971 law that created
rights against dubbing in anticipation of the general revision had
a disclaimer of any effect on existing sound recordings. 177  The
Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California"' held that this left the
state free to penalize dubbing of pre-1972 records. It was sug-
gested to the Senate Committee in 1975 that it might want to
leave intact this kind of state protection (which by then had be-
come quite widespread). So a subsection (4) was added to sec-
tion 301(b), preserving any state rights and remedies with respect
to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972. 17 It was
then pointed out that this exemption from preemption perhaps
went too far. Did it leave the states free to create performance
rights in old recordings? To forbid simulations? To endow per-
petual rights? Did Congress really intend to let the states put the
owners of old sound recordings in such a preferred position?8 °
The response was only a partial one. The House, and ulti-
mately the bill as enacted, in a new section 301(c)' 8' confirmed
the existence of any state rights and remedies until February 15,
2047-a seventy-five year term commencing in 1972, for sound
recordings that may have been made 1, 10, or 50 years earlier.
Never mind whether there is any rational explanation for this pro-
longed period of possible state protection (maybe it was to compen-
sate for the general failure to protect recordings before 1972).
The real difficulty is that Congress said nothing in section 301 (c)
about the permissible scope of state rights. Arguably, using the
approach of Goldstein v. California, it is willing to let the states
recognize performance and simulation rights that it denies to post-
1972 recordings. It may even welcome the experience to be
gained from local variations.
Is there any harm in this? Neither the economy, nor the free
flow of old sounds, is gravely injured by congressional indulgence
of expansive state protection to record makers.18 2  Indeed, the
and "sound" in a large collection of "Swing Era'? recordings. The Court of Ap-
peals reaffirmed that he had no property interest in the "sound," but said that he
was entitled to a trial to explore whether the advertising and labelling of the rec-
ords might amount to passing-off.
177 Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat.
392.
178 412 U.S. 546 (1973); see Brown, supra note 152, at 1041.
179 S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(b) (1976). S. REP. at 116.
180 Letters cited notes 166-67 supra.
181 Cf. 1975 Hearings on H.R. 2223, supra note 98, pt. 3, at 1911 (com-
ments of the Register).
182 But cf. Note, Record Piracy and Copyright: Present Inadequacies and
Future Overkill, 23 MAINE L. REV. 359 (1971).
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extensions of state remedies may never occur. And if a state at-
tempted to create a performance right in old recordings, the
broadcasters might try to say something about a burden on com-
merce. Do radio signals move in commerce more than pirated
records? Perhaps they do. But if a state attempted to curb close
imitations of old records, is that any more repressive than what
the federal law now does for the authors of books and plays? Per-
haps not.
CONCLUSION
The chief difficulty with the chiselled symmetry of section
301 is that it suggests clean lines and sharp boundaries that could
indeed be brought into being by mechanical interpretation. If a
work is not fixed, it is not in federal copyright. If a work is not
in federal copyright, because it is unfixed, or not listed in section
102, the states can deal with it. Even if it is in federal copyright,
the states can recognize rights that are not copyrights. Such a
quickstep-which in my view is a caricature-will overlook the
deeper intricacies of the statute, and the lessons of history.
Mechanical readings of section 301, especially when they lead to
extensions of protection, also neglect, I have argued, the impor-
tance of maintaining the public domain.
Every claimed interest is not entitled to protection. It should
be, and I believe is, a significant part of the federal scheme to
leave some interests unprotected, and to erect no higher protective
walls than are necessary to carry out the constitutional mandate
"to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'1 3  To set
levels of protection only in response to assertions of the needs of
"Authors" is distorting. Congress also observes another mandate
-the preference for competition-in the interest of efficiency
and plenty. And there is still another mandate that affects the
limits of protection of expression, namely the first amendment's
devotion to freedom of expression. Finally, while we are reciting
constitutional priorities, we might recall that the federal system
and state-created rights do not quite stand on an equal footing so
that we choose indifferently from one or the other. The federal
system is embodied in laws that are passed pursuant to the Consti-
tution, and that are therefore supreme, but not all-embracing.
If we fleetingly enlarge our view to take in all three branches
of law that have as their province intellectual and industrial prop-
erty----copyright, patents, and unfair competition-it is interesting
that all have been dual systems. The patent law has strong pre-
183 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
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emptive elements, but Congress accepts, and the Court blesses,
a substantial body of state-regulated industrial property in trade
secrets. Under the commerce power, Congress could legislate ex-
tensively about unfair competition, and it has done so, in setting
up the Federal Trade Commission and in passing trademark laws.
But at the same time the state common and statutory law of un-
fair competition flourishes.
The dual system of common-law copyright has been the first
to go, or if not to go to be pushed into the background. Yet,
what we have hailed as a new unified system of copyright still
turns out to have significant dual aspects, their extent depending
on what is made of section 301. That vaunted assertion of federal
preemption on examination begins to look like a paper tiger. My
position is that it needs to be stiffened by recognition of the fed-
eral interests that have been brought forward. The federal inter-
ests are emphasized not from devotion to insidious centralism, but
because they are national interests-linked moreover with inter-
national copyright relations. There are still local disputes that can
be remitted to local law. And the law, national and local, must
still be responsive to the just claims of the individual author and
artist. But the major pressures for protection and the major calls
for limits on protection arise from the reality that America is one
big communications network, dominated by entities with names
like the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
the American Broadcasting Company, and the Music Corporation
of America. An all-American system of copyright is a necessary
response to this reality.
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